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ABSTRACT
The ideas of centralized political power and monarchy that
emerged from the Mediterranean world are among the most
important philosophical bases for the concept of sovereignty. My
thesis is that the normative idea of an absolute, independent, and
exclusive center of power originates in a complex case of
philosophical hybridity. It is the outcome of the alternation
between the conception of the Sovereign as representing the
supreme power (the indirect theory) and the conception of the
Sovereign as directly containing that power (the direct theory). The
former conception is usually associated with the history of Western
∗ Assistant Professor of Philosophy of Law, Faculty of Law, University of
Catania, Italy.
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political culture and the passage from Greek to Roman ideas of
public authority. The latter conception is typically associated with
the understanding of supreme political power found in Eastern
culture, as exemplified in Persian kingship and the Byzantine
theocracy.
My intention is to show how the modern concept of
sovereignty has emerged from a mixture of these two conceptions.
In fact, the early philosophical structure of sovereignty in both its
monarchical and its democratic versions can be summed up in the
notion of secularized transcendence. The sovereign benefits
simultaneously from both the conceptual model of subjectivity (the
indirect theory) as a mask that represents a center of attribution (le
Roi est mort, vive le Roi), and the conceptual model of a material
supreme subject (the direct theory) who embodies the primacy of
an authority that is beyond actual social relationships (l’État c’est
moi).
I. INTRODUCTION
My thesis is that the normative idea of sovereignty, that is,
of an absolute, independent, and exclusive center of power, is a
complex instance of philosophical and cultural hybridity. It
constitutes a specific kind of mixture whose nature seems obvious
in the complex transition from pre-modernity to modernity but that
is clearly freighted with the multiple nature of the millennia-long
historical experience of Mediterranean life.
This thesis does not challenge the widespread conception of
sovereignty as a typical legal-political category of modernity. That
conception is not at issue in my analysis. In fact, it is precisely
from the perspective of a philosophical discontinuity in the concept
of sovereignty that it becomes possible to grasp the unique mixture
of ancient and modern features to be found in new ways of
theorizing supreme legal and political power. In tracing this
conceptual history, we need to adopt a specific approach that seeks
to identify the area of convergence where past concepts are
subsumed into and transformed by modern concepts. This
approach entails taking account of both the rupturing impact on
culture and society of new principles and the presence of traces of
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past attitudes in the formation of new styles of life and thought. 1
Thus I am not questioning the need to interpret and understand the
concept of sovereignty in a holistic way, that is, by taking into
consideration the network of social, historical, political, and
cultural features that frame modernity.
At first glance, the conception of sovereignty in the
Mediterranean region seems to consist of a temporal-spatial mosaic
of interdependent elements that compose a single conceptual
structure: that of a transcendent, absolute power intended to further
human well-being. The modern European attitude towards
centralized power would appear to derive from this structure, even
when we take account of the indisputable differences between
Eastern and Western conceptions of power. The point is that the
cultural mobility that has always been a feature of the
Mediterranean region allowed for numerous intersections and
cases of intermingling between Eastern and Western cultures in a
way that was decisive for the development of the concept of
sovereignty.
II. BRIEF HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
From a historical perspective, an illuminating picture of
this process of hybridization, specifically relevant to the
development of the concept of sovereignty, is provided by the
relationship between the theocratic autocracies established in the
Egyptian and Persian empires and the structure adopted by the
Roman Empire in the fourth century. 2 As Mommsen observed,
Roman imperial power was based at this time on the model of the
Eastern Hellenistic monarchies. By means of this new model,
1. See REINHART KOSELLECK, VERGANGENE ZUKUNFT:
GESCHICHTLICHER ZEITEN (Suhrkamp, Frankfurt, 1979).

ZUR SEMANTIK

2. Groundbreaking work on this process of hybridization, including the
presentation of precise data, can be found in Pier Giuseppe Monateri, Black
Gaius: A Quest for the Multicultural Origins of the “Western Legal Tradition”,
51.3 HASTINGS L.J. 479 (2000). See also Dionysios Zakythinos, Processus de
Féodalisation, 2 L'HELLÉNISME CONTEMPORAIN 499 (1948); D. ZAKYTHINOS,
BYZANCE: ETAT-SOCIÉTÉ-ECONOMIE (Variorum, London, 1973); SOCIAL AND
POLITICAL THOUGHT IN BYZANTIUM FROM JUSTINIAN I TO THE LAST
PALAEOLOGUS: PASSAGES FROM BYZANTINE WRITERS AND DOCUMENTS (Ernest
Barker ed., Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1957).
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imperial dignity had been sacralized. The emperor was no longer
primus inter pares but rather a distant and holy person. He was
viewed as a divinity that was to be honored; and then, following
Constantine’s reform, as a person representing the divinity. 3
These Hellenistic political models that so strongly
influenced the Eastern Roman Empire and thus the complex
process of formation of the Byzantine Empire had of course in turn
been based on Alexander the Great’s celebrated conquest of the
Persian and Egyptian empires and thus they incorporated a mixture
of Greek, Egyptian, and Persian political and cultural
characteristics. In Alexander’s project and in his political praxis,
the intention was evident of combining Greek political models
with elements of a pronounced Eastern character. Alexander was
attracted in particular by the sacralized conception of the topmost
political figures in Eastern culture.
From this Mediterranean dynamic of the interaction
between legal and political power, the conception of the governor
as Deus et Dominus and the establishment of a vast bureaucratic
apparatus emerged as salient in the most significant political
entities of the region. As well, the cult of the emperor was
established, along with the organization of a system of officialdom
closely linked to the source of power. Finally, this conception of
the sovereign appears to have been systematically transmitted
through the Byzantine interpretation of imperial divinity and was
maintained (of course in Christian terms) even following the
Christianization of the Empire.
Thus in this conception, the emperor, by virtue of his
dignity, is understood to stand above all other people as the
imitation of God. He is God’s shadow on Earth. He is invested
with a majesty of divine origin. He is not just a representative of
the supreme power, but an intermediate figure between God and
humans who participates in the nature of the holy. He is the God of
the World. Indeed, the emperor’s holiness and Christ’s divinity are
strongly connected. Numerous imperial rites and ceremonies of
Byzantine society evince the practice of a sort of
3. See 1-2 FRANTISEK DVORNIK, EARLY CHRISTIAN AND BYZANTINE
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY: ORIGINS AND BACKGROUND (Dumbarton Oaks,
Washington, 1966).
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“Christomimesis.” Thus the common unifying feature of the most
significant (in terms of extension in time and relevance to
modernity) Mediterranean political experience, an experience that
did not come to a formal end until 1453, was that of a relationship
between politics and transcendence: a legitimizing relationship
ensured by the role of a holy emperor conceived of as a figure with
direct contact with the transcendent. 4
This feature is closely linked to a belief shared by the
Byzantines with other peoples of the Mediterranean region, namely
that their community in some manner constituted a divine
manifestation, a theophany. 5 In a framework of this kind, a highly
important notion is that of the center; that is, the idea of the
supreme city as the center of the world where the point of contact
with the transcendent is located.
III. THE HOLINESS OF THE POLITICAL
We are dealing, then, with the question of the relationship
between politics, law, and the dimension of the holy. Within this
framework, the concept of the “holy” is equivalent to the meaning
of a productive social ritual that is never totally subjective, since its
orientation depends on its relationship with the transcendent. In
this sense, the dimension of the holy is the sphere in which
mechanisms of collective and symbolic identification unfold. It is a
foundational dimension for the “political,” since we find in it
original and unchanging dynamics of inclusion/exclusion. We are
dealing with a kind of process of political consecration that is in a
sense very close to Émile Durkheim’s notion of the “holy.” For
Durkheim, the holy stands for a collective representation that
makes it possible to order, and thus constitute, reality. This
representation is a sociocultural datum that allows individuals to
transcend themselves by virtue of their identification with the
group. Thus the symbolic separation of the “holy” from the
4. For an insightful overview of the relationship between holiness and
political power in Christian Europe, see ADVENIAT REGNUM: LA REGALITÀ
SACRA DELL'EUROPA CRISTIANA (Franco Cardini & Maria Saltarelli eds., Name,
Genova, 2000).
5. See HÉLÉNE AHRWEILER, L'IDÉOLOGIE POLITIQUE DE L'EMPIRE
BYZANTIN (PUF, Paris, 1975).

402

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 4

“profane,” deriving from humankind’s original socio-religious
attitude, is the original operation of social classification. 6
And indeed, symbolic function is integral to sacrificial
experience, both in original true sacrifices and in subsequent
developments in which a purely linguistic ceremony prevails over
the physical aspects of the ritual. What is at issue here is the
symbolization of the community’s political and social origins
through its link with the principle of the transcendent. But this
reality is the product of a cultural process of social institution that,
by consecrating a “place,” sanctions a difference between the real
and the unreal, the human and the non-human. Pierre Bourdieu’s
analysis of the meaning of consecrating rituals as legitimizing
rituals of a social reality is precisely relevant here. According to
Bourdieu, in rituals of consecration we are dealing with institutive
rituals of sociality, that is, with rituals that lead to the recognition
as legitimate and natural of a difference that is in fact arbitrary.
From this perspective, the sacralization of a space and of a leader
within this space is an institutive ritual of sociality because it
simultaneously establishes and consecrates a difference.
Thus the institution of society is an operation of attribution
of properties to places, persons, actions, behaviors, and objects in a
way that makes it possible to perceive these properties as
something natural. What is communicated and represented, and
therefore perceived, as the manifestation of the holy (theophany) is
precisely a political and legal order interpreted as the product of a
consecrating separation: “To institute, in this case, is to consecrate,
that is, to sanction and sanctify a particular state of things, an
established order, in exactly the same way that a constitution does
in the legal and political sense of the term.” 7

6. See ÉMILE DURKHEIM, LES FORMES ÉLÉMENTAIRES DE LA VIE
(PUF, Paris, 1968) (1912).
7. PIERRE BOURDIEU, LANGUAGE AND SYMBOLIC POWER 119 (John
Thompson ed., G. Raymond & M. Adamson trans., Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, 1993). The original version is in PIERRE BOURDIEU, LANGAGE ET
POUVOIR SYMBOLIQUE 177 (Éditions du Seuil, Paris, 2001) (1993) (“Instituer, en
ce cas, c’est consacrer, c’est-à-dire sanctionner et sanctifier un état de choses, un
ordre établi, comme fait, précisément, une constitution au sens juridico-politique
du terme.”).
RELIGIEUSE
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IV. THE MODERN CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY
What is really surprising, given the flux of change one
finds in the history of ideas and cultures, is the reappearance at the
end of the sixteenth century of extremely centralized organizations
of political power, in contrast to the chaotic plurality of legal and
political centers of power typical of the Middle Ages. This
reappearance is especially surprising in its implicit assumption and
positioning of a “holy” subject that transcends social reality for the
purpose of governing it. In conceptual terms, this subject stands for
the core of a single, central political and legal power. Thus from
this perspective, the idea of an absolute, exclusive, and
independent power, embodied in the institutional figure of the
sovereign as the core of the modern state, shows the implicit
persistence of a structural conception of supreme power. It is a
conception in which, as we will see, the relationship between
politics and the transcendent continues to figure; but this
relationship has changed in significant ways and now emerges as a
bare conceptual model fully contextualized within the complex
turn of the modern.
It is widely recognized that the crisis of the medieval order
is visible in the process of the formation of modern states.
According to historiography convention, the Peace of Westphalia
of 1648 is emblematic of this epochal political and legal
transformation. 8 What is crucially relevant to the thesis of the
present article is the celebrated reaffirmation in the texts of the
Peace of Westphalia of the principle of cuius regio, eius et religio,
which had been established in 1555 in the Peace of Augsburg. This
principle enshrines the link between an individual’s authority over
a region (including over a kingdom) and that individual’s religious
faith: the latter automatically becomes the state religion. Thus we
have here the establishment of a link between territory and the
cultural identity of a people that is forming itself as a nation under
the exclusive and independent direction of a unique authority.
8. The literature on the Peace of Westphalia is of course vast. For a
systematic but also unconventional conceptual approach, see PEACE TREATIES
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW IN EUROPEAN HISTORY: FROM THE LATE MIDDLE
AGES TO WORLD WAR ONE (Randall Lesaffer ed., Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, 2004).
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Within this set of interconnections that link territorial, political,
and cultural-religious elements, we grasp the existence of the
nucleus of sovereignty as the expression of the modern conception
of political authority.
The feudal lord becomes sovereign in the territory that
belongs to him. Within this framework, he accedes to the status of
the one who has no superior. Thus the sovereign exercises his
power superiorem non recognoscens. His authority is exclusive,
since there is no possibility for the exercise of a legitimate power
that, within a specific territory, is not subject to the sovereign’s
will. But further, his authority is also independent of that of other
sovereigns who symmetrically exercise their own power over
specific populations and territories.
It can thus be affirmed that post-Westphalia European
society was composed of a plurality of territorially based political
systems. Each of these systems had a supreme and independent
governing authority. The medieval political-theological universitas
now acquired the nature of an international societas of sovereign
states. Sovereign power emerged from the intersections and
complex links among political and normative centers that had been
typical of the Middle Ages. Thus the sovereign state, at any rate in
ideal terms, neutralized the medieval system of dispersed powers
and established a centralizing authority. The population governed
by the sovereign had the duty to obey the laws he enacted; and the
possibility of external interference by presumptively superior
authorities, like the pope and the emperor, were in principle
eliminated: rex est imperator in regno suo.
An important example of the modern theory of sovereignty
that nevertheless reveals significant traces of its medieval origins is
Jean Bodin’s Les six livres de la République (1576). 9 Bodin
advances an original notion of absolute power (ab-solutus, that is,
without constraints). On one hand, absoluteness is to be confined

9. For overviews of Bodin’s thought, see ROGER CHAUVIRÉ, JEAN BODIN
AUTEUR DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE (Champion, Paris, 1914); SIMONE GOYARD-FABRE,
J. BODIN ET LE DROIT DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE (PUF, Paris, 1986); Julian H.
FRANKLIN, J. BODIN AND THE RISE OF ABSOLUTIST THEORY (Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, 1973); DIEGO QUAGLIONI, I LIMITI DELLA
SOVRANITÀ: IL PENSIERO DI J. BODIN NELLA CULTURA POLITICA E GIURIDICA
DELL'ETÀ MODERNA (Cedam, Padova, 1992).
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to the exercise of political-legal power in the sense of the
sovereign’s positive statutes. This means the absoluteness does not
equate to power without limits, for the sovereign must respect
God’s laws. On the other hand, Bodin’s intention is not to set
factual limits on sovereign political power. Rather he wishes to
preserve the normative value of the idea of “nature” as a horizon
within which the rationality of sovereign power is to be confined.
The measure of nature provides the foundation for the rationality
of political power and thus the rationality of absoluteness as its
inescapable prerogative. The conceptual supremacy of the
sovereign is rationally justified by the absolute transcendence of
the “natural” order. Interpreting Bodin’s thought, we might say
that, in the modern “natural” world of equal individual subjects, a
purely sovereign power finds its foundations in the rational idea of
an absolute (and so “unequal”) center of power that, by virtue of its
“inequality,” can serve as a legitimate authority over its subjects:
“Similarly sovereign power given to a prince charged with
conditions is neither properly sovereign, nor absolute, unless the
conditions of appointment are only such as are inherent in the laws
of God and of nature.” 10
Thus it is understandable that Bodin should arrive at this
famous definition of sovereignty: “Sovereignty is that absolute and
perpetual power vested in a commonwealth.” 11 Under this
conception, absoluteness coincides with the uniqueness of the
political-legal source represented by the sovereign. Its perpetual
nature is evident in the new prerogative assigned to sovereign
power in modernity, namely exclusive competence to enact laws.
Bodin situates the specific function of a sovereign subject in the
concrete establishment of a normative order. The sovereign is
10. JEAN BODIN, SIX BOOKS OF THE COMMONWEALTH (J. M. Tooley
trans.,
Basil
Blackwell
1955)
(1576),
available
at
http://www.constitution.org/bodin/bodin.txt (Last visited October 24, 2011).
The original version is in J. BODIN, LES SIX LIVRES DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE 89
(Reproduction of the Paris Edition by Jacques du Puys, BNF, Gallica, 15811583) (1576) (“Aussi la souveraineté donnée à un Prince sous charges &
conditions, n’est pas proprement souveraineté, ny puissance absolue: si ce n’est
que les conditions apposées en la création du Prince, soyent de la loy de Dieu ou
de nature.”).
11. Id. The original version is in J. BODIN, LES SIX LIVRES DE LA
RÉPUBLIQUE 85 (1576) (“La souveraineté est la puissance absolue et perpétuelle
d’une République.”).
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justified and legitimized before his modern subjects by virtue of
his ability to deal rationally with the need for coexistence and
within the framework provided by God’s laws.
Another (perhaps more radical) instance of the
development of the modern concept of sovereignty that–
notwithstanding its disruptive assumptions and outcomes–features
traces of a shared heritage with the Mediterranean tradition of
absolute power is found in the theory Thomas Hobbes set out in
Leviathan in 1651. 12
According to Hobbes, the natural condition of equality
between people is an essential condition of subjectivity. The
anthropology of conflict advanced by Hobbes derives from this
radically modern starting point:
Nature hath made men so equal, in the faculties of
the body, and mind; as that though there be found
one man sometimes manifestly stronger in body, or
of quicker mind than another; yet when all is
reckoned together, the difference between man, and
man, is not so considerable, as that one man can
thereupon claim to himself any benefit, to which
another may not pretend, as well as he. 13
Hobbes’ anthropology, relying for its starting point on the
metaphorical-transcendent notion of the state of nature, may be
represented (if perhaps somewhat simplistically) in the form of this
strict logical sequence: equality of individuals => equality of hope
=> possibility of convergent desires for the same goods => mutual
diffidence => war of all against all as outcome of a strategy of
anticipation => consequent generalized condition of brutishness
and isolation.
According to Hobbes, anthropologically, the neutralization
of this endemic conflict in a pre-legal and pre-institutional context
can be guaranteed simply by an internal solution within the
12. From among the many works that deserve mention, I recommend for
general accounts of Hobbes’ life and ideas, RICHARD TUCK, HOBBES (Oxford
University Press, Oxford-New York, 1989); and NORBERTO BOBBIO, THOMAS
HOBBES (Einaudi , Torino, 2004) (1989).
13. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, OR THE MATTER, FORME AND POWER
OF A COMMON-WEALTH ECCLESIASTICALL AND CIVIL 82 (J.C.A Gaskin ed.,
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008) (1651).
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dynamics of the conflict. The conflict itself will select a subject
that has attained, even if only temporarily, to a power that
overcomes all other subjective powers and is thus feared by
everyone. But in order to exploit this precarious situation to obtain
peace before the decline that is inescapable for any temporary
superior power, a stabilizing step is necessary. This stabilization
may be guaranteed by the institutionalization of this
anthropologically based hierarchy. In particular, a stable context is
achievable by means of legal tools (covenants) likely to make
permanent the excess of power of a given subject who, being
feared by all, will be capable of ensuring the peace. Thus the
pactum unionis is also a pactum subjectionis to a subject who is
invested with the power of all the individuals and who thus
becomes the most powerful among them. This makes possible the
transition from the precarious state of nature to a stable and
permanent civil society.
This transition performs its function simply through the
dynamic of representation in which is crystallized the idea of a
sovereign subject who transcends the multitude of people
represented and who is conceived of as an external center of unity
and as himself the condition for unity:
A multitude of men, are made one person, when
they are by one man, or one person, represented; so
that it be done with the consent of every one of that
multitude in particular. For it is the unity of the
representer, not the unity of the represented, that
maketh the person one. And it is the representer that
beareth the person, and but one person: and unity,
cannot otherwise be understood in multitude.14
Thus from a logical-temporal perspective, the covenants are not
divisible, since the members of the multitude are associated with
each other by virtue of the fact that they are subject to the same
institutional person who performs a representative function.
Representation, as legal form, frames the nuclear structure of the
Hobbesian state and the Hobbesian concept of sovereignty. 15 The
14. Id. at 109.
15. The literature on the concept of representation in Hobbesian thought is
vast. To mention just a few insightful interpretations: YVES-CHARLES ZARKA,
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sovereign power, whose institutional end is individuals’ safety, is
legally justified by means of a reciprocal authorization exchanged
by subjects uti singuli:
I authorize and give up my right of governing
myself, to this man, or to this assembly of men, on
this condition, that thou give up thy right to him,
and authorize all his actions in like manner. This
done, the multitude so united in one person, is
called COMMONWEALTH, in Latin CIVITAS. 16
Thus the sovereign stands in an external position with respect to
the covenant. He is a third party who benefits from individuals’
authorizations. The subjects are the authors of the sovereign’s
action. The sovereign is the actor who acts in the name of the
multitude of people. The sovereign’s absoluteness is the outcome
of the totalizing authorization derived from the subjects’ will. The
sole effective limit on the sovereign is imposed by the purpose of
his having been constituted, that is, by the guarantee of a peaceful
social order. But at the end of the day, the effective ability of the
sovereign to maintain the peace is not a limitation on the exercise
of legal-political power. It is precisely the cause of the sovereign’s
existence, and when he can no longer guarantee the peace he
concretely loses the quality of sovereign. This means that
conceptually the Hobbesian sovereign is substantially absolute. He
is really a third party superiorem non recognoscens. He materially
transcends the multitude, since he stands outside the social
contract; and he symbolically transcends the multitude as well,

HOBBES ET LA PENSÉE POLITIQUE MODERNE (PUF, Paris, 1995); Y. C. ZARKA,
LA DÉCISION MÉTAPHYSIQUE DE HOBBES. CONDITIONS DE LA POLITIQUE (Vrin,
Paris, 1999); RAYMOND POLIN, POLITIQUE ET PHILOSOPHIE CHEZ HOBBES (Vrin,
Paris, 1977); DAVID P. GAUTHIER, THE LOGIC OF LEVIATHAN (Clarendon Press,
Oxford, 1969); CARL SCHMITT, DER LEVIATHAN IN DER STAATSLEHRE DES
THOMAAS HOBBES. SINN UND FEHLSCHLAG EINES POLITISCHEN SYMBOL
(Hohenheim verlag, Köln-Lövenich, 1982) (1938); LUCIEN JAUME, HOBBES ET
L’ETAT REPRÉSENTATIF MODERNE (PUF, Paris, 1986); FRANCESCO VIOLA
BEHEMOTH O LEVIATHAN? DIRITTO E OBBLIGO NEL PENSIERO DI HOBBES,
(Giuffrè, Milano, 1979); GIUSEPPE SORGI, QUALE HOBBES? DALLA PAURA ALLA
RAPPRESENTANZA (Franco Angeli, Milano, 1989); ADALGISO AMENDOLA, IL
SOVRANO E LA MASCHERA. SAGGIO SUL CONCETTO DI PERSONA IN THOMAS
HOBBES (Esi, Napoli, 1998).
16. HOBBES, supra note 13, at 114.
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since he embodies its unity: he is “above” the plurality of the
singularities that compose the multitude.
Thus the modern form of political representation as
conceived by Hobbes serves as the condition for thinking about the
unity of a collective body. It does not consist in the representation
of different organizations, social bodies, or parties; it is, rather, the
embodiment of the idea of a people and of its unity made possible
solely by virtue of representation by one person. This unity
acquires its form, its visibility, because of the representative action
of the sovereign. Modern political representation, so conceived,
has a productive and formative nature: it makes visible and present
something that is invisible and absent (a people and its unity)
through the presence of a public (representative) entity. As Carl
Schmitt has said, the dialectical nature of the concept of
representation resides in the fact that the invisible being is
presupposed to be absent and yet at the same time made present. 17
The invisible entity of reference, which seems so crucial to
understanding the epochal political-legal meaning of the concept of
sovereignty in modernity, indicates in a specific way the idea of
openness to transcendence that we earlier described as the main
Mediterranean legacy in our model of a supreme and absolute
power. Thus what emerges from the modern concept of
sovereignty, as well as from the significant role of the notion of
representation within it, is a specific function filled by conceptual
transcendence in order to constitute the political and legal order.
The unity in the multitude that constitutes the crucial political
question of modernity requires a transcendent movement from
empirical reality. This movement is conceptually unresolved, since
the ideal nature of the unity of a people is inescapable and is
always ideal (absent) even when it is made present by virtue of the
political representation of the sovereign.
17. See CARL SCHMITT, VERFASSUNGSLEHRE (Duncker & Humblot,
Berlin, 1928). Discussing the conceptual structure of political-legal
representation see also HASSO HOFMANN, REPRÄSENTATION. STUDIEN ZUR
WORT- UND BEGRIFFSGESCHICHTE VON DER ANTIKE BIS INS 19. JAHRHUNDERT
(Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, 1998); GIUSEPPE DUSO, LA RAPPRESENTANZA: UN
PROBLEMA DI FILOSOFIA POLITICA (Giuffrè, Milano, 1998); GIOVANNI MAGRÌ,
DAL VOLTO ALLA MASCHERA. LA REPRÄSENTATION NEL DIALOGO TRA GUARDINI
E SCHMITT (Scriptaweb, Napoli, 2010); G. MAGRÌ, LA LEGGE DELLA FORMA. LA
SCIENZA DEL DIRITTO DI CARL SCHMITT (Scriptaweb, Napoli, 2010).
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V. SECULARIZED TRANSCENDENCE
Given the conceptual outcome arrived at in the last
paragraph, we should now specify and clarify the Mediterranean
legacy in the concept of sovereignty with a reading of the
relationship between legal-political power and conceptual
transcendence. As Bertrand de Jouvenel has written, there is
nothing less natural than that concentration of authority that makes
authority distant and invisible. 18 A certain aptitude for the mystical
that has historically been weak in the West is needed to grasp the
relevance of this concentration; or failing that, the clear presence
of a dash of belief in the holy. Indeed, the mix of Eastern traditions
of the sacred core of political power with the proto-secularized
understanding of authority typical of Greek and Roman culture
may be seen as one of the cultural conditions for possibility for the
vast process of political unification effected by the establishment
of the state in modernity.
From this perspective, early modern literary descriptions of
political power are significant. The political and existential
representation of the sovereign found in Rosencrantz’s speech in
Act III, Scene iii, of Shakespeare’s Hamlet seems to indicate a
proto-modern centrality of the sovereign, of his soul in relation to
the world around him. Like “a massy wheel / Fix’d on the summit
of the highest mount / To whose huge spokes ten thousand lesser
things / Are mortis’d and adjoin’d,” he is at the center of
everything and has innumerable people attached to him, their
destinies attached to his destiny. 19 The fall of the sovereign is the
fall of a world. This use of the form of the wheel and of the idea of
the center as represented in the sovereign’s soul points to the
unifying capacity of sovereignty when viewed, in modernity, as the
locus of political unity.
The persistence of the symbolism of the center of the
world, then, is highly relevant to an understanding of the modern
face of the sociopolitical, within which the concept of sovereignty
is framed. But how are we to understand the meaning of this
18. BERTRAND DE JOUVENEL, DE LA SOUVERAINETÉ (Genin, Paris, 1955).
19. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET, PRINCE OF DENMARK, act III, sc.
III, (1600-1602).
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persistence? How are we to understand this symbolism, given the
cultural horizons of an age that has emerged out of a gradual
process of secularization? Perhaps we need to recall the cultural
and philosophical core meaning of the concept of sovereignty as it
appeared in the era of the Peace of Westphalia and in the theories
of Bodin and, above all, Hobbes.
The point is to grasp that, from a conceptual perspective,
the logic that governs processes of political sacralization expresses
the institution of a difference, of a distinguishing feature. On one
hand, the process of legitimizing political authority in modernity is
founded on the gradual establishment of a self-sufficient
humanism; 20 on the other hand, it emphasizes the need to institute
a new order: an artificial order built by human beings as a creation
ex nihilo. But as we have seen, the institution of an order is the
institution of a difference in relation to the previous chaotic and
profane space. The logic of modern sovereignty, then, is the logic
of an instituted difference. The sovereign state establishes borders,
that is, signs of difference from other profane states. The state is
established through the consecration of a territory, its inhabitants,
and their form of life.
But this institution is guaranteed, within the conceptual
structure of sovereignty, by openness to a secularized
transcendence: that is, the transcendence of a sovereign subject
who has been instituted as different among equals, as a supreme
being in comparison with inferior others, but above all as the locus
of the authority that transcends all concrete social relationships.
This is an authority that relies on the conceptual model of
subjectivity as the mask to which is attributed the unity of the
institution as the reflex of the ideal unity of the multitude; and this
applies to both the monarch’s mask and the people’s mask. Thus
the secularized transcendence of sovereignty issues from the longterm impersonality of the center of legal and political attribution in
which it is embodied.
The plenitudo potestatis, as potestas directa, is the
technical outcome of this conceptual transcendence. More
precisely, it is the form that the sovereign, as representative of
20. For a description of this concept, see CHARLES TAYLOR, A SECULAR
AGE (The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2007).
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unity, must acquire in order to make visible the empirically absent
unity in the multitude. The peculiar potestas of the sovereign,
being the acting representation of a subject who is one because he
transcends all parties, all singularities, guarantees the transition
from the fragmented multitude of the state of nature to the personmultitude that is a people. Thus symbolically the sovereign must
represent himself as an entity that tries to make immanent, by
virtue of the absoluteness of his power and his decisions, what is in
fact designed to remain transcendent: the pure ideal source of
unity. The continuous attempt to render this ideal earthly is the
regulatory principle of secularized transcendence as embodied in
the modern concept of sovereignty. The process of secularization
consists, then, of just this attempt, never totally successful, to bring
unity to the world. 21 But the attempt is conceptually destined to
partly fail because that unity in se stands outside the world; it
consists precisely of the perspective of the ideal standing above the
material many.
This dynamic helps account for the clear and deep traces of
the pre-modern evident in the visible royal acts engaged in by
several modern monarchies. At least until the French Revolution,
the king could rely on the argument of the divine nature of his
person, for example by pointing to his anointment at Reims; and
this attitude was illustrated by his self-attribution of special powers
(the Sun King proclaiming his own high and dazzling light). When
Louis XIV said l’État c’est moi, he was expressing as well his
awareness of being a material supreme subject who embodied the
primacy of an authority beyond actual social relationships.
Consistently with one strand of the Mediterranean legacy, and thus
with the Eastern culture of political power, he affirmed a
conception of the sovereign as directly containing the transcendent
supremacy of an absolute center of power (direct representation).
Sovereignty is embodied in the monarch’s body. We see here the
attempt to delineate a subject that directly represents transcendence
through the attempt to materialize ideal unity. This is not a third
transcendent king evoked by the sovereign, but rather a presumed
direct earthly-making of the unity in the king’s body.
21. See GIUSEPPE DUSO, LA LOGICA DEL POTERE.
COME FILOSOFIA POLITICA (Laterza, Roma-Bari, 1999).
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At the same time, however, sovereign power represents
itself as articulating, under various configurations, the medieval
theory of the king’s two bodies. 22 The monarch’s physical body,
which, like every body, is destined to suffer disease and decay, is
associated with, and not distinguished from, the institutional and
impersonal political body of a king who, as a power, as the center
of the world, is immortal. The traditional formula adopted
following the accession of a new sovereign, le Roi est mort, vive le
Roi, is something like the emblem of the coexisting conception of
secularized transcendence that seems to be largely associated, at
least until the advent of the Byzantine Empire, with the Greek and
Roman tradition of the impersonal nature of the supreme power. 23
As Ernst Jünger has written, 24 this formula implies a third extratemporal king, and both the dead king and the living one are
images of that king. They are like bodies that wear the mask of this
third totally transcendent king who is the supreme center of
attribution of legal, political, and social life within the state. Thus
we have here, coexisting with the previous theory, a conception of
the sovereign as strictly representing the supreme power and
therefore as representing the original and transcendent source of
absolute power (indirect representation). Indeed, the king’s
physical death makes clear the impossibility of an immanent unity.
The true sovereign is the third, extra-temporal, king and thus the
indirect theory expresses the awareness of the irreducible distance
between the physical unity of a person and the unity in a multitude.
The latter is just an idea, but an idea with tremendous
concreteness. This coexisting conception reminds us that the
attempt to give unity earthly form is destined to fail; but this
reference to unity as a third transcendent idea is understandable
precisely because of the experience of many failures as part of the
pretence of making unity earthly.

22. The best known overview of this theory is provided by ERNST H.
KANTOROWICZ, THE KING'S TWO BODIES: A STUDY IN MEDIEVAL POLITICAL
THEOLOGY (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1957).
23. For a groundbreaking interpretation of the formula “Le roi est mort,
vive le roi” see RALPH E. GIESEY, LE ROI NE MEURT JAMAIS: LES OBSÈQUES
ROYALES DANS LA FRANCE DE LA RENAISSANCE (Flammarion, Paris, 1987).
24. See Ernst Jünger, Der gordische Knoten, in 7 SÄMTLICHE WERKE
(Klett-Cotta, Stuttgart, 1980) (1953).
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The center of attribution that I have now referred to several
times would appear to be, then, the conceptual condition for
thinking about the social bond and unity-in-difference in a
secularized context. As has been implied, the structure here
described has remained substantially unchanged even within the
conceptual model of popular sovereignty that begins with
Rousseau’s theory of democracy, and even taking into account
Rousseau’s notorious aversion to representative democracy. The
twofold conception of secularized transcendence in modern
sovereignty as simultaneously representing directly and
representing indirectly supreme and absolute power is manifestly a
Mediterranean legacy and the expression of a dialectic that enables
the state to perform its regulatory function. This dialectic has,
indeed, a normative nature, since it is what to a certain extent has
allowed, until the present-day crisis of sovereignty, for the
guarantee of a movement towards the impersonality and stability
of the institution as a condition for the regulation of contingent
aspects of social life.
In fact, especially in the initial stages of the trajectory of
change traced by the concept of sovereignty, the reference to the
transcendent as embodied in the figure of the sovereign ensured
that the project of a secularized unification received driving and
legitimizing force. The unity of the supreme center implied the
uniqueness of the source of law, with law viewed as the expression
of the sovereign’s will, thereby guaranteeing the legitimization of
positive law without structural reference to classical or explicitly
theological forms of justification. Subsequently, the gradual
unfolding of the process of secularization allowed for the
emergence of an idea of transcendent sovereignty standing high
above all other things: no longer embodied in the figure of the
sovereign, but rather mainly represented in his person. In this way,
the process of secularization gave rise to an idea more familiar to
us, that of sovereignty as a supreme and depersonalized institution.
What is really at issue in the Mediterranean legacy present in the
concept of sovereignty, in the twofold form of conceptual
transcendence that I have tried to describe, is the establishment of a
dimension of institutional sovereignty, that is, the establishment of
the impersonal legal-political condition for the unification of a
secularized but not desacralized society.
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On this reading, the present crisis of socio-legal unification
found at the level of both states and supranational entities is also a
kind of crisis of the very idea of conceptual transcendence that has
been associated with the concept of sovereignty. In his celebrated
introduction to Leviathan, Hobbes conceives of sovereignty as the
artificial soul of the State, thereby implying it constitutes the
immaterial core of supreme power. He seems also to have had
clearly in mind the Mediterranean legacy that has been discussed
in this paper, in particular as embodied in the Byzantine idea of the
emperor as imitation of God. In Chapter XVII of Leviathan,
Hobbes writes, after describing the social covenant: “This is the
generation of that great LEVIATHAN, or rather (to speak more
reverently) of that Mortal God, to which we owe under the
Immortal God, our peace and defence.” 25 Thus, the Hobbesian
covenant is also an act of faith. It expresses the rational process
that leads subjects to have faith in their sovereign as the one able to
protect them but also as the one who embodies, in his decisions
and his representative actions, the unity of the state, the unity of
the many.
VI. CONCLUSION
Could there be something in the structure of secularized
transcendence that we have no choice but to come to terms with if
our aim is the socio-political unification of individuals in a context
of pluralism and great diversity? Is the radical horizontality of
institutional relationships found in the various contemporary
models of governance really suited to the establishment of a social
bond?
On this score, it is worth remembering Immanuel Kant’s
observations on the nature of the social contract. According to
Kant, the indisputable practical reality of the social contract, as an
idea of reason and as a keystone by which to measure the
legitimacy of every public law, consists in the obligation on the

25. HOBBES, supra note 13, at 114; see ALOYSIUS P. MARTINICH, THE TWO
GODS OF LEVIATHAN (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992) (For an
interesting interpretation, within Hobbesian studies, of the relationship between
politics and transcendence).
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legislator to enact laws in such a way that they could have been
produced by the united will of a people. 26
But the united will of a people is not an empirical fact
discernible through opinion polls, referenda, or elections. It is,
rather, a rational ideal that can be concretely grasped in the form of
the duty of civil union, the duty of life together regulated by law.
The instantiation par excellence of the public good is the civil
constitution of a social union that guarantees everyone freedom by
means of laws. Thus the truly general interest of a polity is an a
priori that precedes any recognition of consent. It is the idea that
allows us to stay together, guaranteeing that nothing has been
decided for a people if that same people could never have
rationally reached the very same decision on its own.
The general interest cannot, then, be the product of the
aggregation of particular interests. The generality of the interest
must be established and understood on a different level, one that
transcends the logic of balance, of compromises, of negotiations.
Indeed, without the assumption of a general interest so conceived,
potential negotiations consistent with the democratic rule of law
are not conceptually possible. Thus the general interest is the
supreme investment in the salus publica; it is the investment in a
regulated civil life that derives from a foundational and
constitutional covenant. It coincides with the “prospect” of a
(never totally) secularized transcendence embodied in the modern
sovereignty of the people.
Modern democracy, in the form of power of the people and
government by the people symbolically conceived, finds a
condition for its possibility in the conceivability of the general
interest, because a people as a synthetic unity finds conceptual
consistency precisely in the representative form of the general
interest. From this perspective, a people should be conceived of as
the rational outcome of a way of thinking of political unity that
presupposes a multitude of subjects. This way of thinking unity
seeks unceasingly to bring to reality, to make immanent, the unity
and the existence of a people. We need only consider all the
26. See Immanuel Kant, Über den Gemeinspruch: Das mag in der Theorie
richtig sein, taugt aber nicht für die Praxis, XXII BERLINER MONATSSCHRIFT,
201 (Sept. 1793).
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attempts to render the direct will of the people empirically visible
through referenda and deliberation and the fact that these attempts
never seem to pin down unity in a material way and make it
possible to perceive a people as one sole thing.
At the end of the day, what I hope can be grasped from the
path pursued in this text is the pregnant historical-conceptual
nature of the notion of sovereignty. Assuredly it is a modern
concept, but within its structure of meaning a specific theoretical
tradition about supreme political power has been absorbed and has
evolved in line with modern conditions. The Mediterranean legacy
bequeathed to the concept of sovereignty through the mutually
enriching interactions between the Greek, Egyptian, and Persian
cultures of power, and manifested in the mixture that constituted
the principle of the topmost political subject in the Byzantine
Empire, has clearly been incorporated into the founding ideas of
political representation. In this model, representation always comes
from the top, from the openness to transcendence that sacralizes
the polity that constitutes representation. Modern political
representation similarly comes from the top, from the ideal
dimension of unity that cannot be discerned in the empirical
multitude.
The major modern difference resides in certain
foundational assumptions about the representation of unity. In
modernity, the rational foundation emerges from the bottom, from
the convergent wills of rational agents, naturally equal, free,
autonomous, and independent. But at the same time, since the sum
of particular wills is different from the will of a people, and since
the will of a unitarian people is the sole requirement for the
modern legitimization of power, openness to a “conceptual top,”
where the idea of unity is visible, becomes inescapable even for
modernity. This bottom/top dialectic seems thus to capture the
movement of the concept of sovereignty in modernity; but I would
argue that this movement appears to have been triggered by the
long and venerable tradition of political power in Mediterranean
culture.

